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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System regu­
larly states in its current economic policy directive that the macroeco-
nomic goals of monetary policy are; price stability, full employment, eco­
nomic growth, and a satisfactory balance of payments. The nature of the 
policy which the Federal Reserve pursues will depend upon the particular 
objective or objectives which they feel is dictating their actions. Fre­
quently. the situation exists where the desired direction of monetary 
policy called for when the Federal Reserve attempts to achieve one objec­
tive is in direct contradiction to the direction of policy if a different 
objective had been of prime importance. An example of this situation would 
exist when the economy is experiencing inflation and relatively high unem­
ployment. If the Federal Reserve wishes to achieve full employment, they 
should pursue a relatively easy monetary policy. If the Federal Reserve 
wishes to achieve price stability, they should pursue a relatively tight 
monetary policy. 
Since the Federal Reserve does not clearly state the priorities which 
it attaches to the various objectives, there is a need to determine the 
priorities used by the Federal Reserve in determining monetary policy. 
These priorities should be the same as those set by the elected representa­
tives. However, the guidelines established by Congress in the Employment 
Act of 1946 are sufficiently broad to allow for different interpretations. 
Consequently, the priorities used by the Federal Reserve may differ from 
those intended by Congress. This possibility is accentuated by the inde­
pendent agency status of the Federal Reserve, This allows for considerable 
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latitude in the Federal Reserve's interpretation of the desires of Con­
gress, 
Before discussing the desirability of continuing the independence of 
the Federal Reserve, it is necessary to determine the priorities used by 
the Federal Reserve. A number of attempts have been made to empirically 
discover the Federal Reserve's trade-offs among the objectives. However, I 
feel that these studies may not have uncovered the true determinants of 
intended monetary policy due to the manner in which they have measured mon­
etary policy. 
Before discussing the nature of this problem, it is necessary to dis­
cuss the nature of monetary policy. When the Federal Reserve pursues an 
expansionary or contractionary policy, it does not have an immediate impact 
upon the policy objectives. Consequently, the Federal Reserve needs to use 
an intermediate measure of the effect of their policy actions on the econ­
omy. This intermediate tneasnre of the effect of monetary policy is the 
"target" of monetary policy. Suggested targets of monetary policy ir.clude 
various measures of the money supply and market rates of interest. How­
ever, these targets will be influenced by many things in addition to mone­
tary policy actions. Consequently, it is necessary to have an "indicator" 
of monetary policy to determine the thrust of policy actions. Tlic indica-
tor shows which of the changes in the target are the result of policy 
actions. Therefore, with the appropriate indicator it is possible to iden­
tify the direction of monetary policy.^ 
For a more complete discussion of targets and indicators of monetary 
policy and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various targets and 
indicators, see Karl Brunner and (footnote continued on following page) 
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As mentioned earlier, this study is concerned with the objectives of 
monetary policy. The prior investigations, which will be reviewed in Chap­
ter 11J of the objectives of monetary policy have related these objectives 
to various indicators of Federal Reserve policy actions. However, if the 
indicator used in the study is not actually used by the Federal Reserve, 
then the study will not accurately reveal the priorities which the Federal 
Reserve attaches to the objectives. To avoid this problem, I shall 
directly determine the intended direction of monetary policy. In Chapter 
III, I shall discuss how I have determined the intended direction of mone­
tary policy as stated by the members of the Federal Open Market Committee, 
I shall then use discriminant analysis to relate the objectives of monetary 
policy to the intended direction of monetary policy. The results of this 
analysis will allow me to make inferences with regard to the objectives 
which are instrumental in determining the direction of intended monetary 
policy. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) Allan Meltzer (5,6), also see 
Michael J, Hamburger (15). Further discussion of the appropriate indicator 
of monetary policy can be found in the articles which are reviewed in Chap­
ter II of this study. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There have been several studies which have investigated the Federal 
Reserve System's reaction to movements in the macroeconomic goals of the 
United States economy. The dominant technical reason in these studies for 
identifying the determinants of monetary policy is to determine if monetary 
policy is endogenous. This is necessary since an aggregate model of the 
economy will be misspecified if monetary policy variables are treated as 
exogenous when in fact they are endogenous.^ In this chapter, I shall 
review the previous studies of the Federal Reserve's reaction to the macro-
economic objectives. 
William G. Dewald and Harry G. Johnson (10) were the first to attempt 
to determine the objectives of United States monetary policy. They con­
structed a reaction function which related an indicator of monetary policy 
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to the objectives of monetary policy. Dewald and Johnson then drew infer­
ences with regard to the weights which the Federal Reserve attached to the 
various objectives. Several indicators of monetary policy were used; the 
supply of money, market rates of interest, and member bank reserves. The 
consumer price index, unemployment percentage, balance of payments deficit, 
and real gross national product were used to represent the objectives of 
price stability, full employment, a satisfactory balance of payments^ and 
economic growth. Dewald and Johnson performed the regressions with 
^For a further discussion of this problem see: Stephen M. Goldfeld 
(14), Raymond E. Lombra and Raymond G. Torto (22), and Ronald L. Teigen 
( 2 7 ) .  
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Dewald and Johnson credit G. L. Reuber (24) for the invention of and 
first application of the reaction function. 
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quarterly data for the period 1952-1961. Their results indicate that dur­
ing this period the Federal Reserve was primarily concerned with the full 
employment and economic growth objectives. The price stability and balance 
of payments objectives did not have an important influence on monetary 
policy. 
James Christian (9) claimed that two technical errors in the Dewald 
and Johnson study resulted in inaccurate conclusions with regard to the 
Federal Reserve's objectives. Christian argued, first, that the regression 
coefficients represented the combined influence of feedback effects and 
preference weights. Secondly, he criticized Dewald and Johnson for not 
testing the temporal stability of the coefficients. Using the supply of 
money, free reserves, and the 90-day treasury bill rate as possible indica­
tors of monetary policy. Christian performed regressions on a 20-observa-
tion moving average of quarterly data for the years 1952-1966. The meas­
ures of the objectives used by Christian were the same as those employed by 
Dewald and Johnson. Christian's results indicate that the price stability 
objective was important during inflationary periods and that the balance of 
payments objective was important during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 
Also, the full employment and economic growth objectives were intermit­
tently important determinants of monetary policy during this period. 
A third study which investigated the objectives of monetary policy was 
conducted by John Wood (28). In this study. Wood developed a preference 
function for the Federal Reserve and assumed that the Federal Reserve 
attempts to maximize its utility subject to the structure of the economy. 
As measures of the objectives of monetary policy, Wood used the change, 
from quarter t-1 to quarter t, in the values of real gross national product. 
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the quarterly average of the unemployment rate, the balance of payments 
surplus, and the industrial materials component of the wholesale price 
index. The indicator of monetary policy which Wood used was free reserves 
adjusted for required reserve ratios. Wood then concluded that during the 
period 1952-1963 the Federal Reserve did respond to changes in gross 
national product, employment, prices, and the balance of payments. 
So that he could treat monetary policy as endogenous in his model of 
the monetary sector, Ronald Teigen (27) estimated the determinants of mone­
tary policy. Teigen's indicator of monetary policy is the sum of unbor­
rowed reserves of member banks and currency outside of banks. He then 
related this indicator to the objectives of monetary policy. Teigen con­
cluded that for the years 1953-1964 the Federal Reserve was primarily 
interested in the full employment and balance of payments objectives. Eco­
nomic growth and price stability were not very important in explaining 
monetary policy for this period. 
In an attempt to explain the determinants of fiscal and monetary pol­
icy, Ann Friedlaender (12) constructed a model for the years 1954-1964. To 
investigate the differences in the priorities between Presidential adminis­
trations, Friedlaender included a dummy variable for Republican and Demo­
cratic administrations. Friedlaender used the deviation of the actual 
level from the desired level as measures of the objectives of government 
policy. Friedlaender's results indicate that both the Eisenhower and the 
Kennedy-Johns on administrations were primarily interested in price stabil­
ity and a favorable balance of trade. In addition, she concludes that 
neither administration placed much weight on the full employment objective. 
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However, the Kennedy-Johnson administration was more concerned about unem­
ployment than the Eisenhower administration. 
Thomas Havrilesky (16) estimated a Federal Reserve reaction function 
for 1952-1965. Havrilesky's study differs from previous studies in two 
ways. First, he attempted to dismiss the problem of reverse causality^ by 
assuming a one-quarter lag in the response of the objectives to changes in 
monetary policy. The changes in the policy instrument in period t 
reflected the Federal Reserve's reaction to the objectives in period t, but 
the objectives in period t are not influenced by Federal Reserve policy in 
period t. Secondly, Havrilesky suggests that total reserves adjusted for 
legal reserve requirement changes are the preferred indicator of monetary 
policy. He believes that adjusted total reserves are the best indicator 
since the Federal Reserve can offset nonpolicy forces which affect this 
indicator. Also, adjusted total reserves reflect changes in all three of 
the Federal Reserve's coiiveiitional tools of monetary policy. He rejected 
free reserves, the money supply, and interest rates as indicators because 
changes in these indicators often are the result of nonpolicy market phe­
nomena. Consequently, they may be misleading. Havrilesky rejects unbor­
rowed reserves as an indicator since it does not reflect all three monetary 
tools. Nominal gross national product, the unemployment rate, and the 
As first pointed out by Christian (9), one of the problems in iden­
tifying the determinants of monetary policy is the possibility of a feed­
back effect. If this occurs, the coefficients attached to the objectives 
of monetary policy represent the combined influence of the objective on the 
indicator and the influence of the indicator on the objectives. Havrilesky 
assumed that the lag in tl.e effect of the indicator on the objectives is 
long enough to assure one-way causation, from the objective to the indie-
tor. 
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balance of payments deficit are entered into the regression equation lin­
early. The difference between the actual and desired wholesale price index 
is entered in quadratic form. Havrilesky squares the price variable since 
he believes that the Federal Reserve's reaction to inflation will be 
increasingly strong as inflation increases, Havrilesky concluded that 
price stability, full employment, and income growth are important determi­
nants of monetary policy. The balance of payments objective was not impor­
tant. 
Michael Keran and Christopher Babb (19) developed a model to explain 
the apparent contradiction between Federal Reserve policy statements and 
actual monetary policy measured with monetary aggregates. They believe 
this can be accomplished by including the Federal Reserve's duties as "bank 
of last resort" and fiscal agent for the Treasury as objectives of monetary 
policy, Keran and Babb use free reserves as a proxy for the macroeconomic 
stabilization objectives• Tbey feel that this is justified since free 
reserves are highly correlated with Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer's (4) 
quantification of the Federal Open Market Committee's policy directives,^ 
As a measure of monetary policy, Keran and Babb use the monetary base. 
Their conclusion is that much of the Federal Reserve's behavior is dic­
tated by attempts to meet their macroeconomic and financial objectives. 
This quantification involves assigning negative values to relatively 
tight policy statements and positive values to relatively easy policy 
statements. Keran and Babb found a high correlation between the level of 
free reserves and the cumulative policy statement index. 
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The last two articles which I shall review are the most recent and the 
most comprehensive studies of the determinants of monetary policy. 
As in the other articles reviewed, Richard Froyen (13) estimated a 
reaction function for the Federal Reserve. Unlike prior articles, Froyen 
uses monthly data in his regression. He believes that monthly data have 
two distinct advantages over quarterly data. First, using monthly data 
brings the study into the same time framework as the Federal Open Market 
Committee meetings. Secondly, he believes that using monthly data will 
remove all possibility of reverse causation, in response to James 
Christian's criticism of the Dewald and Johnson article,^ Froyen estimated 
three reaction functions: the Eisenhower years (1953-1960), the Kennedy-
Johnson years (1961-1968), and the Nixon years (1969-1972). Froyen experi­
mented with two indicators of monetary policy, the monetary base and the 
sum of unborrowed reserves and currency held by the public. The "targets" 
of monetary policy which Froyen tests are the one-month lagged levels of 
the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the balance of payments surplus, 
total manufacturing and trade sales, outstanding privately held federal 
government debt, the long-term corporate bond rate, and the full employment 
surplus. The first three measures correspond to the objectives of full 
employment, price stability, and a satisfactory balance of payments. Total 
sales is a measure of the level of economic activity. The next two meas­
ures correspond with the fiscal agent and "bank of last resort" duties of 
the Federal Reserve, The full employment surplus is used to determine the 
^As discussed earlier, James Christian criticized Dewald and Johnson 
for not reporting on the temporal stability of the regression coefficients. 
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effect of fiscal policy shifts on monetary policy. The full employment 
objective and the level of economic activity are the only significant 
determinants of monetary policy during the years 1953-1960. For 1961-1969, 
Proyen found that the full employment, price stability, level of economic 
activity, and "bank of last resort" objectives were important. In addi­
tion, fiscal policy shifts had an effect on monetary policy during this 
period. Finally, the results for the years 1969-1972 indicate that the 
full employment objective, the level of economic activity, the balance of 
payments surplus, and the fiscal agent objective had effects on Federal 
Reserve action. 
The last article to be reviewed in this study will be that of Thomas 
Havrilesky, Robert Sapp, and Robert Schweitzer (17). Their reaction func­
tion tests the importance of the objective of price stability, full employ­
ment, and the balance of payments position upon the Federal Reserve's 
policy actions. They calculate different reaction fuuctions for announced 
periods of monetary ease and tightness, for different chairmen of the Board 
of Governors, and for different presidential administrations. Havrilesky, 
Sapp, and Schweitzer criticize the prior estimates of Federal Reserve reac­
tion functions for two reasons. First, if monetary aggregates are used as 
a measure of policy actions, when the Federal Reserve does not attempt to 
control these aggregates, the estimates do not measure intent of policy. 
Secondly, they agree with Froyen and use monthly data to reduce the likeli­
hood of a problem with reverse causality. Havrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer 
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use the Federal Funds rate as an indicator of monetary policy.^ For the 
period January 1964 to November 1966, they conclude that price stability 
and the international position of the dollar were of prime importance in 
determining monetary policy. For the combined periods of December 1966 to 
November 1967 and July 1968 to December 1968, the full employment objective 
is most important. The coefficient of the price stability variable is sig­
nificant but much smaller than in the preceding period. Price stability is 
the major determinant of Federal Reserve actions in the combined periods of 
January 1969 Co January 1970 and December 1967 to June 1968. Havrilesky, 
Sapp, and Schweitzer report that the full employment objective and the 
international position of the dollar influenced policy actions during the 
months from February 1970 to July 1971. Price stability is the most impor­
tant objective for August 1971 to September 1972. During the last period 
analyzed, September 1972 to February 1974, the coefficients on the full 
employment and international position of the dollar objectives are signifi­
cant. 
Two of the conclusions which Havrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer draw 
from their analysis are particularly interesting in the context of the 
present study. First, they feel that the Federal Reserve has become less 
stringent in reacting to inflation since the late 1960s. Secondly, they 
feel that the Federal government in general and the Federal Reserve in 
Havrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer feel that there is considerable evi­
dence to support their contention that the Federal Funds rate is an accu­
rate measure of policy intent. However, I feel that their criticism of 
other indicators applies equally well to the Federal Funds rate. 
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particular have become willing to "live with" what used to be "unacceptably 
high" levels of unemployment.^ 
For an earlier time period, 1952-1963, John Wood concluded that the 
Federal Reserve had conducted monetary policy in a manner consistent with 
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the expressed intent of Congress. Also, the results of studies prior to 
that by Havrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer indicate that the Federal Reserve 
has acted to stabilize the macroeconomy. 
On explanation for the conclusion drawn by Havrilesky, Sapp, and 
Schweitzer is that during the late 1960s and early 1970s the Federal 
Reserve did adopt the philosophy of "living with" higher levels of infla­
tion and unemployment. An alternative explanation is that the Federal 
Funds rate is not an adequate indicator of intended monetary policy. 
In this study, I shall measure the intent of monetary policy as 
reflected in the reports of the policy discussions of the Federal Open Mar­
ket CommiLtee. By measuring monetary policy Intent with an easy or tight 
classification, I can avoid several problems which exist in the prior 
studies of the determinants of monetary policy. First, I can avoid the 
technical problem of how monetary policy actually affects the economy. 
Secondly, I can avoid the possibility of nonpolicy market forces influenc­
ing my indicator of monetary policy. I will not have to assume chat the 
^Havrilesky, Sapp, aud Schweitzer further state that "overall, the 
results indicate that in the past decade the Federal Reserve has responded 
to the state of the economy in a manner only very roughly consistent with 
its implicit mandate from Congress to stabilize the economy" (17, p. 851). 
"The evidence indicates that the Federal Reserve possesses a welfare 
function that may not be unreasonable in the light of the provisions of the 
Employment Act and other manifestations of the desires of the electorate" 
(28, p. 156). 
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Federal Reserve is able to predict unwanted changes in the indicator or 
that the Federal Reserve actually does take actions to offset these 
unwanted changes. 
As with the study performed by Froyen and that of Havrilesky, Sapp, 
and Schweitzer, I shall use monthly data. This will reduce the likelihood 
of a problem with reverse causality. Also, as pointed out by Froyen, 
monthly data more closely correspond with the Federal Open Market Committee 
meetings than quarterly data do. Consequently, I should be able to more 
closely identify the turning points of Federal Reserve policy with monthly 
data than is possible with quarterly data. 
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CHAPTER III. THE MODEL 
Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant Analysis is a statistical technique for identifying those 
characteristics of two or more distinct groups which best describe the dif­
ferences among the groups. For example, suppose that an item must belong 
to one of two distinct populations, or Then, the characteristics 
and Xg of that item may be identified and plotted on a two-dimensional 
graph. Figure 3.1 depicts six items, three from rr^ and three from n-g' 
Next, the discriminant function, D(X^,X2), which best divides the two popu­
lations may be determined. 
Xr 
TT 1 , 1  TT 1 , 2  
DCKl.Xg) 
Figure 3.1. Discriminant analysis example 
The linear discriminant model requires that three conditions be satis­
fied with regard to the independent variables. These are; 
1) The means of the independent variables are different for the two 
populations, 
15 
2) The independent variables have normal distributions for each 
group. 
3) The variance and covariance of the independent variables are 
equal within groups. 
If these conditions are met, then the linear discriminant function will 
minimize the number of incorrect classifications. From Figure 3-1, the 
discriminant function 0(X^,X2) provides a boundary which minimizes the 
probability that an item from is grouped with items from and that an 
1 
item from rrg is grouped with items from -
In this study, the items must belong to one of two groups, relatively 
easy monetary policy or relatively tight monetary policy. When there are 
two groups in the analysis, discriminant analysis is similar to regression 
2 
analysis. Although the two types of analysis are not the same, the 
results of the analyses are comparable. Therefore, if there are two 
groups, regression analysis niay be used to compute rbp discriminaut func­
tion. The F ratio will indicate the discriminating power of the indepen­
dent variables. The t ratio may be used to test the significance of the 
individual coefficients. 
In this study, I shall use the stated macroeconomic objectives of the 
Federal Reserve to discriminate between periods of easy and tight monetary 
policy. This will enable me to determine whether or not the Federal 
Reserve does base policy decisions upon the objectives of price stability, 
For a detailed presentation of discriminant analysis, see Ar.ant M. 
Kshirsagar (20) or Maurice M. Tatsuoka (26). 
2 
For a discussion of this similarity, see Kshirsagar (20), Tatsuoka 
(26), and George W. Ladd (21). 
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full employment, economic growth, and a satisfactory balance of payments. 
Also, it will allow me to make inferences with regard to the priorities 
which the Federal Reserve assigns to these objectives. 
Classification of Policy Intent 
As alluded to in Chapter II, the use of money market variables as 
monetary aggregates as an indicator of monetary policy is inadequate for 
the purpose of this study. Although the appropriate indicator may measure 
actual monetary policy, it is not clear that it will always measure 
intended monetary policy. If the Federal Reserve knows the structure of 
the economy and is able to control the appropriate monetary variable, then 
intended policy will always be the same as actual policy. Since the Fed­
eral Reserve's knowledge of the structure of the economy is less then per­
fect, it is unlikely that intended and actual policy are the same at all 
times. Also, the lag in the availability of data raises some doubt about 
the ability of the Federal Reserve to control the monetary aggregate indi­
cators . 
In this study, the intent of monetary policy is that policy supported 
by a majority of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 
The majority opinion was deduced from my reading of the Record of Policy 
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee in the various issues of the 
Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 1956-1974. For 1975, the Record 
of Policy Actions of the FOMC was taken from various issues of the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. The policy intent was classified as easy if the majority 
felt that the policy actions should act to stimulate the economy. Policy 
intent was classified as tight if the majority felt that policy actions 
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should act to restrain the economy. If in any given month the committee 
did not act to change the direction of policy intent, then the classifica­
tion for that month was the same as for the preceding month. Although 
changes in the discount rate were never used as the sole basis for classi­
fication, they were used as a supplement to the Record of Policy Actions of 
the FOMC.^ The policy classification used in this study is summarized in 
Table 3.1. 
Beginning in late 1954, the FOMC adopted a tight policy stance which 
lasted until November 1957, The meeting of November 12 resulted i'.i the 
belief that a relaxation of pressure was called for. Two days later the 
discount rate was reduced from 3%% to 3%. This period or ease lasted until 
August 1958. On August 14, 1958, the discount rate was increased from 
1 3/4% to 2%. The policy consensus of the FOMC at the August 19, 1958, 
meeting was for reduced reserve availability. 
Although the meeting on March 1, 1960, called for less restraint, not 
ease, I have dated the return to expansionary policy as March 1960. This 
seems to be justified on the basis of the discussion at the April 12, 1960, 
meeting of the FOMC. The desire for further easing at this meeting implies 
that the policy of ease had been in effect prior to April 12, 1960. 
Therefore, I have classified March as the month for the switch to ease. 
This period of ease continued throughout the rest of 1960 and 1961. 
At the December 19, 1961, meeting, the FOMC began a process of gradual 
reduction in the existing degree of ease. This continued throughout 1962 
Appendix A gives a summary statement or the majority opinion for each 
meeting of the FOMC between January 1956 and December 1975. Also included 
are the changes in the discount rate for 1956 through 1975. 
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Table 3.1. Classification of intended monetary policy 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1956 T^ T T T T T T T T T T 
1957 T T T T T T T T T Ï E^ E 
1958 E E E E E E E T T T T T 
1959 T T T T T T T T T T T T 
1960 T T E E E E E E E E E E 
1961 E E E E E E E E E E E E 
1962 E E E E E E E E E E E E 
1963 E E E E E E T T T T T T 
1964 T T T T T T T T T T T T 
1965 T T T T T T I T T T T T 
1966 T T T T T T T T T T T E 
1967 E E E E E E E E E E E T 
1968 T T T T T T E E E E E T 
1969 T T T T T T T T T T T T 
1970 T T E E E E E E E E E E 
1971 E E E T T T T T E E E E 
1972 r E E E E E E E T T T T 
1973 T T T T T T T T E E E E 
1974 E E T T T T T E E E E E 
1975 E E E E E E E E E E E E 
"^Represents a tight policy, 
^Represents a policy of ease. 
and the first six months of 1963. Then in July of 1963, as indicated by 
the policy record and the increase in the discount rate, policy intent 
became tight. Monetary policy remained tight during the last half of 1963 
and continued tight in 1964, 1965, and the first eleven months of 1966. At 
the meeting held on November 22, 1966, the members of the FOMC voiced a 
desire for easier conditions. This policy of easy monetary policy lasted 
through November 1967, 
When the Board of Governors approved the increase in the discount rate 
on November 20, 1967, the money market experienced an increase in pressure. 
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The FOMC decided on December 12, 1967, that this increased pressure wac 
desirable. 
The next switch to a policy of ease occurred in July 1968, but this 
lasted only five months. The increase in the discount rate and the policy 
directive of December 17, 1968, marked the return of tight policy. This 
lasted until the March 10, 1970, meeting of the FOMC; at this meeting the 
policy consensus switched from firm conditions to moderate growth of aggre­
gates. 
The reappearance of tight policy occurred in April 1971, but this 
lasted only five months. Then, from September 1971 until September 1972, 
the policy intent of the FOMC was expansionary. 
The easy policy initiated in September 1973 lasted until March 1974, 
when the FOMC called for conditions which would moderate growth in aggre­
gates. The ease which began in August 1974 lasted throughout 1975. 
As a partial check on my classification, I have compared my analysis 
of the direction of intended monetary policy with that of four other peo­
ple. Patrie Hendershott (18) made the following classification after read­
ing the policy directives and the minutes of the meetings of the FOMC. 
Only the March and April 1960 classifications are different from mine. As 
discussed earlier, I feel that March 1960 should be classified as easy 
since the FOMC meeting on April 12, 1960, resulted in a call for further 
easing. 
Tight 
1/56-10/57 
8/58-4/60 
11/57-7/58 
5/60-12/62 
Ease 
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From his reading of the report of the FOMC meetings as given in the 
Annual Report of the Board of Governors, Leonell C. Anderson (1) made the 
following classification. 
Tight Ease 
6/59-2/60 3/60-12/61 
1/62-12/64 
My classification differs from Anderson's for the months of January 1962 
through June 1963. As explained earlier, the FOMC began to reduce the 
degree of ease in December 1961. Although this reduction continued through 
June 1963, I believe that intended policy was still expansionary. 
This period, January 1962-June 1963, was the most difficult to clas­
sify, The reason for this difficulty is that during this period, more than 
at any other time, the FOMC members couched their discussion in terms of 
degrees of ease and restraint. This ambiguity is the result of the con­
flict between domestic and international objectives. While there was need 
to stimtjlare the economy for domestic reasons^ the countries' deteriorating 
balance of payments position called for monetary restraint. 
From the Digest of Principle Federal Reserve Policy Actions, as 
reported in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors, Thomas R. 
Atkinson (3) made the following classification. 
Tight Ease 
1/57-10/1/51 10/22/57-8/4/58 
8/19/58-12/15/59 1/12/60-12/13/60 
Atkinson's classification for January and February 1960 is the only one 
which differs from my classification. I believe that the tight classifica­
tion for these two months is correct since the meeting in January called 
for restraint and the February meeting called for watchful waiting. 
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By using changes in the discount rate and reserve requirements as sup 
plements to the minutes of the FOMC meetings, as reported in the Annual 
Report of the Board of Governors, William Poole (23) classified the intent 
of monetary policy as stable, easing, or firming. Since his definition of 
a stable policy is an unchanged policy, the following is a summary of his 
classification using only the firming and easing classification to repre­
sent tight and easy policy. 
The months which disagree with my classification are November 1961-June 
1963 and November 1966. The reasons for my classification of 1962 and the 
first half of 1963 have been given previously. November and December of 
1961 were classified as expansionary since the policy directives of Novem­
ber 14 and December 5, 1961 called for the "same degree of ease." I do not 
feel that policy during 1966 was changed to ease until the meeting of 
November 22. The majority of the FOMC members felt that, at the time of 
the meeting on November 1, a "significant change in policy was not war­
ranted." Therefore. I feel that the switch to ease occurred on November 22, 
1966, not November 1, 1966, as reported by Poole. 
The basic hypothesis being tested in this study is whether or not the 
Federal Reserve basis its intended policy upon the macroeconomic objectives 
of price stability, full employment, economic growth, and the balance of 
payments position. The hypothesized relationship may be stated as: 
Tight Ease 
12/11/54-10/22/57 
7/29/58-2/9/60 
10/24/61-10/4/66 
11/27/67-6/18/68 
12/17/68-
11/12/57-7/8/58 
3/1/60-10/3/61 
11/1/66-11/14/67 
7/16/68-11/26/68 
Theoretical Framework 
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MP = f(P,U,y,BP) (3.1) 
where: 
MP is a measure of intended monetary policy. 
P is a measure of price stability. 
U is a measure of unemployment. 
y is a measure of growth in the economy. 
BP is a measure of the balance of payments. 
As discussed earlier, intended monetary policy was classified as rela­
tively easy or relatively tight. Then, with this grouping of monetary pol­
icy, I shall derive a linear discriminant function to determine whether or 
not the objectives of monetary policy can be used to characterize the dif­
ference between the groups. 
If the Federal Reserve does consistently base its policy actions upon 
these objectives, then the following relationships should exist; 
1) Kising prices are associated with tight monetary policy. Falling 
prices are associated with easy monetary policy. 
2) High unemployment is characteristic of easy money periods. Low 
unemployment is characteristic of tight money periods. 
3) High economic growth is associated with tight money periods. Low 
or negative economic growth is associated with easy policy. 
4) A balance of payments surplus is related to easy monetary policy. 
A balance of payments deficit is related to tight monetary policy. 
The discriminant function estimated in this study will be of the form: 
(3.2) 
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where; 
The g. are the discriminant function coefficients, 
MP^ is the measure of intended monetary policy in month t.^ 
U ^ is the monthly percent of the civilian labor force which is 
unemployed in month t-1. 
^A^IWPI is the change in the industrial commodities component of the 
t-2 wholesale price index, lagged one month^ 
^A^IPI is the change in the industrial production index, lagged one 
t-2 monthp 
LBP H is the most recently available value for the liquidity bal-
^ ance of payments surplus.^ 
The lag structure employed in equation 3.2 is based upon my reading of 
the Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee. Given 
When estimating the discriminant functions, it is necessary to assume 
that the intent of monetary policy in month t is independent of monetary 
policy in month t-1. 
2 
During the meetings of the FOMC, movements in the consumer price 
index, the wholesale price index, and the industrial commodities component 
of the wholesale price index are frequently discussed. Separate discrimi­
nant functions were estimated with the three indices. Best results were 
obtained with the industrial commodities component of the wholesale price 
index. Results obtained when using percentage changes in the indices were 
very similar to those obtained when the changes in the indices were used. 
3 
The industrial production index is used since it is available on a 
monthly basis. 
balance of payments objective is included in the study since Lue 
members of the FOMC frequently meaLion the balance of payments in their 
discussions. Values for the balance of payments are available on a quar­
terly basis. The method used for transforming the quarterly data to a 
monthly basis is based upon my reading of the Record of Policy Actions of 
the Federal Open Market Committee. When mentioned at meetings during the 
first two months of a quarter, the reference is usually to the balance of 
payments in the preceding quarter. At meetings during the third month of a 
quarter, the reference is usually to the balance of payments in the current 
quarter. Therefore, when estimating the discriminant functions, monetary 
policy in the first two months of each quarter is a function of the balance 
of payments in the preceding quarter. The current quarterly value is used 
for the third month in each quarter. 
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the time framework of the statements of concern, with regard to the various 
macroeconomic objectives, this lag structure seems to be the most logical 
choice. 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The timespan for this study is January 195Ô through December 1975. To 
make the results more meaningful, I have divided this period into three 
subperiods which correspond with Presidential administrations. The first 
subperiod is the Eisenhower years, January 1956 through January 1961. The 
second subperiod runs from February 1961 through January 1969, the years 
corresponding to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The final sub-
period is for the Nixon and Ford administrations, February 1969 through 
December 1975. 
By dividing the 20-year span into subperiods, I have reduced the prob­
lem of structural change in the decision-making framework of the Federal 
Reserve. Also, by using Presidential administrations as subperiods, I will 
be able to make inference with regard to any differences among the priority 
systems used by the Federal Reserve during the different administrations.^ 
The Eisenhower Years, January 1956-January 1961 
During this period, there were 20 months of monetary ease and 41 
months of tight monetary policy. The estimated discriminant function is; 
D, . = a. + + a/Â^IWPI + + a LB? (4.1) 
-J- - - - - -J-.2 ' \-2 
where; 
D^ ^  is the discriminant score for month t^ during the Eisenhower 
' administration. 
In Appendix B, I have presented the results for the 20-year period as 
a whole. 
2 
As mentioned before, regression analysis was used to estimate the dis­
criminant function. George Ladd (21) (footnote continued on following page) 
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is the seasonally adjusted monthly percent of the civilian 
labor force which is unemployed (8, 11). 
t ~ 1 
A IWPI is the change in the industrial commodities component of the 
t-2 wholesale price index, lagged one month. 1967 = 100 (8, 25). 
t " 1 
A IPI is the change in the industrial production index, lagged one 
t-2 month. 1967 = 100 (8, 11). 
is the most recently available value for the gross liquidity 
balance of payments surplus, in millions. Seasonally 
adjusted (7). 
Table 4.1 gives the overall and group means for the independent vari­
ables in equation 4.1 and the results of the regression performed on equa­
tion 4.1. 
For all of the variables in equation 4.1, the group means are signifi­
cantly different at the 5% level. The F ratio for the discriminant func­
tion is highly significant and indicates that the difference between easy 
and tight money can be described by looking at the macroeconomic objec­
tives. Given the signs of the overall means of the variables in equation 
4.1, only the coefficient of the balance of payments variable has the wrong 
sign. However, the low percentage discriminating power and lack of signifi­
cance of the coefficient rules out any influence by the balance of payments. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) suggests that the dependent vari-
N 
able for the first group, tight policy, be defined as; ^Tight = = —, 
N 61 
For the second group, easy policy, the dependent variable is defined as; 
"Ease = - = - tr-
N 61 
^The quarterly data were used in the following manner. Monetary policy 
during the first two months of each quarter was a function of the gross 
liquidity balance for the previous quarter. The present quarterly value 
was used for the third month in each quarter. 
Table 4.1. Eisenhower results 
Regression results 
Standard Percentage 
Means error of discriminating 
Variable Tight Ease Overall Coefficient coefficient power 
"t-l 4. 9317 
5 .8050 5. 2180 -0 .100308 0. 062491 24. 56 
0. 1829 -0 .0600 0. 1033 0 .790555*** 0. 251588 38. 78 
t-2 
'^A^IPI 0. 3000 -0 .3200 0. 0967 0 .136582** 0. 070168 28. 00 
t-2 
-467. 6340 -762 ,5498 -364, 3276 0 .000076 0. 000133 8, 66 
b 
Cons tant 0 .468915 
F = 9.47118*** = . 403523 
^The percentage discriminating power in Tables 4.1, 4.4, and 4.7 is a measure of the relative 
importance of each independent variable in tlie discriminant function. It is computed by forcing the 
sum of the standardized regression coefficients to be equal to one. 
^The constant is a correction for the maans of the raw data and is equal to the sum of the 
products of the estimated coefficients and t'le overall means of the independent variables. 
A, **, and *** appearing in Tables 4.1, 4.4, and 4.7 indicate significance at the 10%, 5X), and 1%, 
levels, respectively. 
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The percentage discriminating power for each of the independent vari­
ables indicates that during the Eisenhower administration the Federal 
Reserve was most concerned with the stabilization of prices. The second 
most important objective was economic growth, followed closely by full 
employment. The wrong sign on the balance of payments coefficient rules 
out any consistent influence on monetary policy. 
Table 4.2 gives the comparison between actual intent of monetary 
policy, as determined by my classification, and the predicted intent of 
monetary policy, as determined by equation 4.1.^ 
Table 4.2. Comparison of actual and predicted monetary policy, Eisenhower 
administration 
Actual 
Ease 
Ease 
Predicted 
Tight 
18 
(90.0%) 
11 
(26.8%) 
2 
(10.0%) 
30 
(73.2%) 
Overall agreement 78.69% 
In Table 4.3, I have listed the months for which the predicted classi­
fication differs from the actual classification. 
To determine the predicted intent of policy, I compared the "critical 
value" of equation 4.1 to the predicted monthly values of equation 4.1. 
^ ^ n ^ — — 
The "critical value," D , is determined by: D = % Z B.(X. + X ). 
t,e tje 1 It. iT 
If the predicted value was greater than or equal to D , the predicted 
t,e 
classification for that month was tight. If the predicted value was less 
than D , then the predicted classification for that month was ease. 
t, 0 
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Table 4.3. Months for which actual and predicted classifications differ, 
Eisenhower administration 
Predicted: Tight 
Actual: Ease 
January 1958 
April 1960 
Predicted: Ease 
Actual: Tight 
January 1956 
July 1956 
June 1957 
August 1958 
October 1958 
November 1958 
July 1959 
September 1959 
October 1959 
November 1959 
December 1959 
The discriminant function 4.1 classifies three months in the second half of 
1958 and five months in the second half of 1959 as being easy when my clas­
sification is tight. These incorrect classifications may be accounted for 
by the higher than average level of unemployment during these periods. 
Also, with the incorrect sign on the balance of payments variable, the 
higher than average balance of payments deficit during these months con­
tributes to the prediction of monetary ease. 
One explanation for the discrepancies listed in Tables 4,3, 4.6, and 
4.9 is that while the intent of monetary policy can be thought of as a con­
tinuum between tight and ease, I have forced a tight or easy classifica­
tion. This results in some ambiguity with regard to those months where the 
intent of monetary policy is not clearly stated. However, with the statis­
tical method being used in this study, this problem cannot be avoided. A 
second possible source of error is that during any particular month, the 
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members of the FOMC may be most concerned about some other objective of 
monetary policy. For example, during months of large debt financing by the 
Treasury, the FOMC may be preoccupied with maintaining an orderly market. 
The Kennedy/Johnson Years, February 1961-
January 1969 
This period contained 46 months of monetary ease and 50 months of 
tight monetary policy. The estimated discriminant function for this period 
is: 
t-1 . , t-1 
° (4,2) 
where; 
D , is the discriminant score for the Kennedy/Johnson years.^ 
t , K/ j 
is the^net liquidity balance of payments surplus, in mil­
lions. Seasonally adjusted (25). 
t "" i t ~ 1 
U T, A IWPI, and A IPI are defined as for equation 4.1. 
t - 2  t - 2  
Table 4.4 contains the overall and group means for the independent 
variables in equation 4.2 and the results of the regression performed on 
equation 4.2. 
Only for the net liquidity balance of payments is the mean during 
tight months not significantly different, at the 5% level, from the mean 
^The dependent variable for the first group, tight policy, is defined 
N 
Y S 6 A 6 
as: Tight = —-— = —. The dependent variable for the second group, 
N 
Y Tight 50 
easy policy, is defined as : Ease = ^ 
2 
The quarterly observations were transformed to a monthly basis, for 
equation 4.2, in the same manner as for equation 4.1. 
Table 4.4. Kennedy/Johnson results 
Variable 
"t-l 
^IWPI 
t-2 
t-2 
LBP^ _ 1  
Cons tant 
Tight 
Me ans 
Ease 
4.5120 
0.1380 
0 . 6 1 6 0  
-644.0999 
5.2065 
0.0413 
0.3000 
-716.0869 
Overall 
Regression results 
Coefficient 
Standard Percentage 
error of discriminating 
coefficient power 
4.8447 
0.0917 
-0.108434** 
0.547476* 
0.050788 
0.324395 
2 8 . 6 2  
23.12 
0.4646 
•678.5937 
0.212095** 
0.000168 
0.490905 
0,081138 
0.000114 
30.61 
17.65 LO o 
F = 5.95279*** = ,207394 
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during easy months. The F ratio for equation 4.2 is highly significant, 
indicating that the raacroeconomic objectives can be used to describe the 
difference between easy and tight policy periods. As with equation 4.1, 
only the coefficient of the balance of payments objective has the incorrect 
sign. Despite the fact that this coefficient is much closer to being sig­
nificantly different from zero than the corresponding coefficient in equa­
tion 4.1, it is still not significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level. 
The values for the percentage discriminating power indicate that dur­
ing the Kennedy/Johnson years the Federal Reserve attached top priority to 
economic growth. This objective was closely followed in importance by full 
employment. Price stability ranked third in importance. Although the bal­
ance of payments position shows more importance during the Kennedy/Johnson 
years than during the Eisenhower years, the sign of the coefficient rules 
ciit c.ny consistent imnacc on the Federal Reserve's intent of policy. 
Actual intent of monetary policy, during the Kennedy/Johnson adminis­
tration. is compared with the predicted intent of monetary policy in Table 
4.5, 
Table 6.5. Comparison of actual and predicted monetary policy, Kennedy/ 
Johnson administrations 
Ease 
Predicted 
Tight 
Overall agreement 72,92% 
Actual 
Ease 
35 
(76,1%) 
15 
(30.0%) 
11 
(23.9%) 
35 
(70.0%) 
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The months for which the predicted classifications differ from the 
actual classifications are listed in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Months for which actual and predicted classifications differ, 
Kennedy/Johnson administrations 
Predicted; Tight 
Actual; Ease 
Predicted; Ease 
Actual: Tight 
December 1961 July 1963 
August 1962 August 1963 
January 1967 October 1963 
February 1967 December 1963 
September 1967 March 1964 
November 1967 April 1964 
July 1968 June 1964 
August 1968 July 1964 
September 1968 September 1964 
October 1968 October 1964 
November 1968 November 1964 
February 1965 
March 1965 
May 1965 
February 1968 
There are 14 nonths in the period July 1963 through May 1965 which are pre­
dicted easy by equation 4.2 but are tight according to my classification. 
For all of these months, except for March and May 1965, the higher than 
average unemployment rate contributes to the inconsistency. Also, toward 
the end of this period the balance of payments deficit is much higher than 
average for the Kennedy/Johnson years. Since the coefficient for the bal­
ance of payments had the wrong sign, this deficit contributes to the pre­
diction of easy policy for these months. The tight predictions of the four 
months in 1967, which are classified as being easy, may be accounted for by 
the much larger than average changes in the industrial commodities 
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component of the wholesale price index. The tight predictions in the sec­
ond half of 1968 can be explained by the smaller than average balance of 
payments deficit. The wrong sign on the coefficient of the balance of pay­
ments variable together with the relatively small deficit contribute to the 
tight prediction for these months, 
The Nixon/Ford Years, February 1969 -
December 1975 
There were 48 months of easy monetary policy and 35 months of tight 
monetary policy during this period. Equation 4.3 is the estimated discrim­
inant function for the Nixon/Ford years. 
\,n/£ ' + CzYlWfl + (4.3) 
where: 
is the discriminant score for the Nixon/Ford years.^ 
4- — 1 t * 1 
U A IWPI, 6 IPX; and LBP . are defined as for equation 4.2. 
t-2 t-2 
Table 4.7 contains the overall and group mean: for the independent 
variables in equation 4.3 and the results of the regression performed on 
equation 4.3. 
Only for the unemployment rate is the mean during tight months signif­
icantly different, at the 5% level, from the mean during easy months. As 
with equations 4.1 and 4.2, the significant F ratio for equation 4.3 
^The dependent variable for the first group, tight policy, is defined 
N 
as: ^Tight = The dependent variable for the second group, 
N OJ „ 
easy policy, is defined as: Ease N ~ 83" 
Table 4.7. Nixon/Ford results 
Regression results 
Variable 
^-1 
t" L 
A IWPI 
t-2 
t-2 
LBP^ _ 1  
Constant 
Tight 
4.6514 
0.9600 
0.3857 
-3059.0286 
Means 
Ease 
6.1833 
0.7917 
-0.0708 
-2073.5208 
Overall 
5,5373 
0 .8626  
0.1217 
•2489.0962 
Coefficient 
Standard Percentage 
error of discriminating 
coefficient power 
-0.174542*** 
0.032515 
0.066058* 
•0.000022 
0.874325 
0,032177 
0.040500 
0.0376531 
0.000016 
57.90 
8.56 
18.70 
14.84 
F = 9.39838*** R = .325221 
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indicates that the macroeconomic objectives can be used to describe the 
difference between easy and tight policy periods. All of the coefficients 
for the variables in equation 4,3 have the correct sign. 
The values for the percentage discriminating power leave little doubt 
that, during the Nixon/Ford years, the Federal Reserve was most concerned 
with the full employment objective. Economic growth and the balance of 
payments position place far behind in second and third, respectively. Sur­
prisingly, price stability does not seem to have had much of an influence 
oa the intended monetary policy during the Nixon/Ford administrations. 
Table 4.8 contains the comparison of the actual intent of monetary 
policy with the predicted intent of monetary policy. 
Table 4.8. Comparison of actual and predicted monetary policy, Nixon/Ford 
adminis trations 
Actual 
Ease 
Predicted 
Tight 
32 
(66.7%) 
! 
5 
(14.3%) 
16 
(33.3%) 
30 
(85.7%) 
Overall agreement 74.7% 
Table 4.9 contains a list of the months for which the predicted clas­
sifications differ from the actual classifications. The prediction of ease 
for the five months in 1971, which are classified as tight, can be 
accounted for by the relatively high unemployment rate for these months. 
The tight prediction for the months of March through July 1970 and October 
1973 through January 1974 differs from my classification of relatively easy 
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Table 4.9. Months for which actual and predicted classifications differ, 
Nixon/Ford administrations 
Predicted; Tight Predicted; Ease 
Actual: Ease Actual; Tight 
March 1970 April 1971 
April 1970 May 1971 
May 1970 June 1971 
June 1970 July 1971 
July 1970 August 1971 
October 1971 
November 1971 
February 1972 
March 1972 
May 1972 
October 1973 
November 1973 
December 1973 
January 1974 
August 1974 
September 1974 
moneLaL-y policy. The zajor contribuLing factor to this discrepancy is the 
lower than average unemployment rate during these months. Five months in 
late 1971 and early 1972 and two months in late 1974 are predict' by equa­
tion 4.3 as being tight. The inconsistency with my classificat, i is 
accounted for by the higher than average balance of payments deficits which 
occurred during these months. For equation 4.3, a balance of payments 
deficit contributes to a prediction of tight monetary policy. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, I have attempted to 
determine whether or not the Federal Reserve basis monetary policy deci­
sions upon the stated macroeconomic goals of price stability, full employ­
ment, economic growth, and a satisfactory balance of payments. Secondly, I 
have attempted to determine the relative importance which the Federal 
Reserve attaches to these objectives. 
To accomplish these goals, I have estimated discriminant functions for 
three subperiods: the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy/Johnson 
administrations, and the Nixon/Ford administrations. The variables 
included in the discriminant functions are used to characterize the differ­
ence between the discriminant analysis groups: intended monetary ease and 
intended tight monetary policy. 
Despite the inherent difficulties with forcing a discrete classifica­
tion upon the intent of monetary policy, this study has avoided the prob­
lems associated with the prior studies of the determinants of monetary 
policy. By directly measuring the intent of monetary policy. I do not have 
to make any assumptions with regard to the actual indicator used by the 
Federal Reserve, Also, I do not have to be concerned with the ability of 
the Federal Reserve to control the indicator. 
Since, in all three subperiods, the discriminant functions do differ­
entiate between periods of tight and easy intended monetary policy, I have 
concluded that the Federal Reserve does base its policy decisions upon the 
previously mentioned macroeconomic objectives. However, the relative 
38 
importance of these objectives is different for each of the three discrimi­
nate functions. 
During the Eisenhower administration, the priority structure used by 
the Federal Reserve had price stability as the most important raacroeconomic 
objective of monetary policy. Economic growth was the second most impor­
tant raacroeconomic objective during this period. 
During the Kennedy/Johnson administrations, the Federal Reserve 
employed a priority structure which gave top priority to economic growth 
and full employment. Maintenance of price stability had an influence on 
the intent of monetary policy; however, price stability was less important 
thsii economic growth and full employment. 
Perhaps the most interesting result of this study concerns the objec­
tives which influenced Federal Reserve behavior during the Nixon/Ford 
administrations. While I would expect that price stability had a major 
irr.pact on mcnstsry policy dying r'nis period, there is no evidence to indi­
cate that price stability had any influence at all. The results for this 
period indicate that full employment was the most important raacroeconomic 
objective of intended monetary policy. Economic growth was important; how­
ever, economic growth was far less important than full employment. 
Although I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
balance of payments objective is zero, there is sorae evidence that the bal­
ance of payments did influence monetary policy during the Nixon/Ford years. 
For this subperiod, the balance of payments coefficient does have the 
expected sign. Also, this coefficient is much closer to being signifi­
cantly different from zero in equation 4.3 than it was for equations 4,1 or 
4.2. 
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Although not definitive, the results of this study indicate that the 
Federal Reserve has pursued policy objectives which are within the guide­
lines set by Congress. A particularly interesting conclusion of this study 
is that the priority structure used by the Federal Reserve differs between 
Presidential administrations. Consequently, this suggests that with the 
existing structure of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve feels 
free to alter the relative importance of the various macroeconomic objec­
tives . 
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APPENDIX A. POLICY CONSENSUS OF THE FOMC AND CHANGES 
IN THE DISCOUNT RATE, 1956-1975 
Policy 
1956 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
January Tight 
February Tight 
March Tight 
April 
May 
June 
1957 
January 
February 
March 
Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
July Tight 
August Tight 
September Tight 
October Tight 
November Tight 
1/10 
1/24 
2/15 
3/6 
3/27 
4/13 
4/17 
5/9 
5/23 
6/5 
6 / 2 6  
7/17 
8/7 
8/21 
8/23 
9/11 
9/25 
10/16 
11/13 
11/27 
restraint on credit expansion 
restraint on inflationary developments 
no relaxation of pressure on bank reserves 
continue restraint 
additional restraint 
^discount rate increased (2% to 2 3/4) 
no relaxation of pressure 
credit restraint continued suitable 
generally restrictive 
limit expansion; avoid increase in pressure 
doubts resolved on side of ease 
continuation of firm restraint 
strengthen credit restraint 
somewhat more restrictive 
doubts resolved on the side of tightness 
same degree of pressure; doubts on side of ease 
maintain present degree of restraint 
continuing credit restraint 
did not intend an overt change away from policy 
of restraint 
•^discount race eased (2 3/4 
December Tight 12/10 existing policy should not be changed 
Tight 1/8 continued restraint on credit expansion 
1/28 restore degree of restraint of late 1956 
Tight 2/18 continuation of status quo 
Tight 3/5 maintain present conditions 
3/26 restraint; doubts resolved on side or greater 
rather than less restraint 
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Policy 
1957 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Augus t 
September 
October 
December 
1958 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
Tight 4/16 
Tight 5/7 
5/28 
Tight 6/18 
Tight 7/9 
7/30 
Tight 8/20 
8/20 
Tight 9/10 
Tight 10/1 
10/22 
November Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
11/12 
11/14 
12/3 
12/17 
1/7 
1/21 
1/28 
2/11 
3/4 
3/6 
3/25 
4/15 
4/17 
5/6 
5/27 
6/17 
previous increased pressure was appropriate 
continue existing restraint 
maintain restraint 
continue firm policy of restraint 
maintain existing restraint 
maintain pressure 
*discount rate increased (3 to 3%) 
maintain current conditions 
broad policy of restraint, doubts resolved on 
side of less rather than greater restraint 
same degree of restrictive pressure 
did not want increased restraint, resolve doubts 
on side of ease 
moderate relaxation of degree of restrictive 
pressure 
^discount rate decreased (3% to 3) 
further moderating of restrictive pressure 
no additional major easing 
slight easing 
^discount rate decreased (3 to 2 3/4) 
maintaining same conditions 
even keel policy tipped on the side of ease 
monetary ease 
^diacouûL rate decreased (2 3/4 to 2^) 
conditions slightly easier 
maintain condition of ease 
^discount rate decreased (2% to 1 3/4) 
policy of ease should be continued 
even keel 
no action taken to cause tone of market to get 
materially easier or tighter 
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Policy 
1958 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes 
July 
Augus t 
1959 
January 
February 
Mar"/-*!-» 
April 
May 
June 
July 
Ease 
Tight 
September Tight 
October Tight 
November Tight 
December Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
T-Î ahf-
Tight 
Tight 
August Tight 
September Tight 
7/8 continued monetary case 
7/29 recapturing redundant reserves that were expected 
to be released to the market on August 1st 
8/14 ^discount rate increased (1 3/4 to 2) 
8/19 move toward reduced reserve availability 
9/9 maintain same tone in market 
9/30 no further restraint, nor any desire to ease 
10/21 undesirable to aim toward greater restraint 
10/23 ^discount rate increased (2 to 2%) 
11/10 continue same moderate degree of restraint 
12/2 let market developments tend to increase 
restraint 
12/16 somewhat greater restraint 
1/6 
1/27 
2/10 
3/3 
3/6 
3/24 
Tight 4/14 
Tight 5/3 
5/26 
5/29 
6/16 
7/7 
7/28 
8/18 
9/1 
9/10 
9/22 
same degree of restraint 
continue current degree of restraint 
same degree of pressure 
same restraint with doubts resolved on side of 
restraint: 
*discount rate increased (2% to 3) 
same restraint 
same degree of pressure 
continue existing conditions 
intensification of restraint 
^discount rate increased (3 to 3%) 
continuance of policy of restraint 
no change, doubts resolved on side of ease 
same degree of restraint 
continue present degree of restraint 
maintain existing pressure 
*discount rate increased (3% to 4) 
maintain same, with deviations on side of less 
restraint 
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1959 
Policy 
Direc t ion Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
October 
November 
December 
1960 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
November 
December 
1961 
January 
Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
10/13 
11/4 
11/24 
12/15 
1/12 
1/26 
2/9 
3/1 
3/22 
4/12 
5/3 
5/24 
6 / 2  
6/14 
7/6 
7/26 
Ease 8/11 
8/16 
September Ease 9/13 
watchful waiting 
maintain feeling of stability 
maintain same degree of restraint 
maintenance of same degree of restraint 
same degree of restraint 
same degree of restraint 
watchful waiting 
moderately less restraint 
no tightening and no further relaxation 
favored easing further the reserve position 
further relaxation 
moderate expansion of bank credit 
^discount rate decreased (4 to 3%) 
watchful waiting, deviations on side of ease 
continue providing reserves at same rate 
provide reserves for moderate bank credit expan-
O JLUtt 
^discount rate decreased (3% to 3) 
moderate bank credit expansion, doubts resolved 
on side of ease 
supply needed reserves readily, doubts on side 
of ease 
October Ease 10/14 supply needed reserves readily, doubts on side 
Ease 
Ease 
Ease 
February Ease 
10/25 doubts resolved on side of ease 
11/22 no change in current degree of ease 
12/13 moderately greater degree of ease 
1/10 same amount of ease 
1/24 no change in existing degree of ease 
2/7 no change in policy 
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1961 
Policy 
Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes ( 
March Ease 3/7 policy of ease continues 
3/28 maintain existing degree of ease 
April Ease 4/18 same degree of ease 
May Ease 5/9 maintain same conditions 
June Ease 6/6 no change in policy of ease 
6/20 same degree of reserve availability, doubts 
resolved on side of ease 
July Ease 7/11 same degree of ease 
Augus t Ease 8/1 same degree of ease 
8/22 same degree of ease 
September Ease 9/12 same degree of ease, doubts resolved on side 
October Ease 
November Ease 
December Ease 
less ease 
10/3 same degree of ease 
10/24 continue same policy, doubts resolved on side of 
less ease 
11/14 same degree of ease 
12/5 same degree of ease 
12/19 somawhat slower rate of increase in total 
reserves 
1962 
January Ease 1/9 maintain prevailing condition; even keel 
1/23 no change in policy 
February Ease 2/13 no change in policy 
3/6 no change in policy 
March Ease 3/27 no significant easing 
April Ease 4/17 no change in policy 
May Ease 5/8 no change in policy 
5/29 no change in policy 
June Ease 6/19 slightly less ease 
July Ease 7/10 no further reduction of ease 
7/31 even keel 
August East 8/21 continuation of recent policy 
September Ease 9/11 no cLaiige in policy 
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1962 
Policy 
Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes f*) 
October Ease 10/2 no change in policy 
10/23 no change in policy 
November Ease 11/13 moderate further increase in bank credit and 
money 
December Ease 12/4 no change in policy 
12/18 somewhat less ease 
1963 
January Ease 1/8 continue policy adopted in December 
1/29 no change in policy 
February Ease 2/12 no change in policy 
March Ease 3/5 continuation of the same degree of monetary ease 
3/26 no change in policy 
April Ease 4/16 no change in policy 
May Ease 5/7 slightly less ease 
5/28 maintain the slightly lesser degree of ease 
June Ease 6/18 no change in policy 
July Tight 7/9 maintain present degree of firmness 
7/I6 "discount rate increased (3 to 3%) 
7/30 slightly greater degree of firmness 
Augus t Tight 8/20 maintain prevailing firmness 
September Tight 9/10 maintain prevailing conditions 
October Tight 10/1 maintain prevailing conditions 
10/22 maintain prevailing conditions 
November Tight 11/12 maintain prevailing conditions 
11/26 maintain same conditions 
December Tight 12/3 maintain same conditions 
12/17 maintain same conditions 
1964 
January Tight 1/7 maintain same condition in money market while 
accumulating moderate expansion in bank credit 
1/28 maintain same conditions 
February Tight 2/11 maintain same conditions 
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1964 
Policy 
Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1965 
Tight 3/3 
3/24 
Tight 4/14 
Tight 5/5 
5/26 
Tight 6/17 
Tight 7/7 
7/28 
8/18 Tight 
Tight 
Tight 
9/8 
9/29 
10/20 
Tight 11/10 
11/23 
Tight 12/1 
12/15 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
somewhat firmer in money market, while accommo­
dating moderate expansion in bank credit 
maintain the slightly firmer conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
maintain same conditions 
^discount rate increased (3% to 4) 
larger than usual degree of flexibility 
maintain same conditions 
January Tight 1/12 maintain the same conditions 
February Tight 2/2 slightly firmer money market conditions 
March Tight 3/2 maintain the slightly firmer conditions 
3/23 slightly firmer conditions 
April Tight 4/13 maintaining the firmer conditions 
May Tight 5/11 maintain same conditions 
5/25 maintain same conditions 
June Tight 6/15 maintain same conditions 
July Tight 7/13 maintain same conditions 
Augus t Tight 8/10 maintain same conditions 
8/31 maintain same conditions 
September Tight 9/28 maintain same conditions 
October Tight 10/12 maintain a firm tone 
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Policy 
1965 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes f*") 
November Tight 11/2 maintain same conditions 
11/23 maintain same conditions 
December Tight 12/3 ^discount rate increased (4 to 4%) 
12/14 moderating any further adjustments in money and 
credit markets 
1966 
January Tight 1/11 same money market condition, moderating growth 
in aggregrates 
February Tight 2/8 gradual reduction in reserve availability 
March Tight 3/1 further gradual reduction in reserve availability 
3/22 maintaining same conditions 
April Tight 4/12 further gradual reduction in reserves 
May Tight 5/10 some further reduction in net reserve availabil­
ity and greater reduction if growth in required 
reserves does not moderate 
June Tight 6/7 about the same conditions 
6/28 about the same conditions 
July Tight 7/26 about the same conditions 
ûnonsr Tight 8/23 supply minimum amount of reserves 
September Tight 9/13 maintain firm conditions 
October Tight 10/4 maintain same conditions 
November Tight 11/1 significant change in policy not warranted 
11/22 somewhat easier conditions 
December Ease 12/13 somewhat easier conditions 
1967 
January Ease 1/10 somewhat easier 
February Ease 2/7 maintain prevailing condition of ease 
March Ease 3/7 somewhat easier 
April Ease 4/4 somewhat easier 
4/7 *discount rate decreased (4% to 4) 
May Ease 5/2 maintain prevailing conditions 
5/23 maintain same conditions 
June Ease 6/20 maintain same conditions 
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Policy 
1967 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
July Ease 7/18 maintain prevailing, but modified to moderate 
any unexpected expansion of bank credit and 
money 
Augus t Ease 8/15 maintain prevailing conditions 
September Ease 9/12 maintain prevailing conditions 
October Ease 10/3 maintain prevailing conditions 
10/24 maintain prevailing conditions 
November Ease 11/14 maintain prevailing conditions 
11/20 ^discount rate increased (4 to 4%) 
11/27 facilitate orderly market adjustments to 
increased discount rate 
December Tight 12/12 slightly beyond the firmer conditions that 
developed with increased discount rate 
1968 
January Tight 1/9 maintaining the somewhat firmer conditions 
February Tight 2/6 maintaining firm conditions 
March Tight 3/5 somewhat firmer conditions 
3/14 maintaining firm 
3/15 *disc"'int rate increased (4% to 5) 
April Tight 4/2 slightly firmer conditions 
4/18 ^discount rate increased (5 to 5%) 
4/19 firmer conditions 
4/30 maintaining the firmer conditions 
May Tight 5/28 maintaining firm conditions 
June Tight 6/18 maintaining generally firm 
July Ease 7/16 accommodating the tendency toward somewhat less 
firm conditions 
August Ease 8/13 maintaining prevailing conditions 
8/16 ^discount rate decreased (5% to 5%) 
September Ease 9/10 maintaining prevailing conditions 
October Ease 10/8 maintaining prevailing conditions 
10/29 maintaining prevailing conditions 
November Ease 11/26 maintaining prevailing conditions 
Policy 
1968 Direction Date 
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Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
December Tight 12/17 *discount rate increased (5% to 5%) 
12/17 attaining firmer conditions 
1969 
January Tight 1/14 maintain prevailing firm condition 
February Tight 2/4 maintain prevailing firm condition 
March Tight 3/4 maintain about the prevailing firm condition 
April Tight 4/1 maintain prevailing firm condition 
4/3 *discount rate increased (5% to 6) 
4/29 maintain prevailing firm condition 
May Tight 5/27 maintain the prevailing pressure 
June Tight 6/24 maintain the firm conditions currently prevailing 
July Tight 7/15 maintain the currently prevailing firm conditions 
Augus t Tight 8/12 maintain the prevailing firm conditions 
September Tight 9/3 maintain the prevailing firm conditions 
October Tight 10/7 maintain the prevailing firm conditions 
November Tight 11/25 maintain the prevailing firm conditions 
December Tight 12/16 maintain the prevailing firm conditions 
1970 
January Tight 1/15 maintain firm conditions 
February Tight 2/10 somewhat less firm condition [Burns] 
March Ease 3/10 moderate growth in aggregates 
April Ease 4/7 continue moderate growth in aggregates 
May Ease 5/5 desires to see moderate growth in aggregates 
5/26 with moderate growth in aggregates 
June Ease 6/23 with moderate growth in aggregates 
July Ease 7/21 promote moderate growth in aggregates 
Augus t East 8/18 somewhat greater growth in aggregates 
September Ease 9/15 easing in credit markets and moderate growth in 
money 
October Ease 10/20 easing in credit markets and moderate growth in 
money 
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1970 
Policy 
Direction Date Policv Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
November Ease 11/11 ^discount rate decreased (6 to 5 3/4) 
11/17 easing in credit markets and moderate growth in 
money 
11/30 *discount rate decreased (5 3/4 to 5%) 
December Ease 12/15 maintain recent conditions 
1971 
January Ease 1/8 ^discount rate decreased (5% to 5\) 
1/12 accommodative conditions in credit markets. mod' 
erate expansion of aggregates 
1/19 ^discount rate decreased (5% to 5) 
February Ease 2/9 maintain prevailing conditions 
2/13 ^discount rate decreased (5 to 4 3/4) 
March Ease 3/9 maintain prevailing conditions 
April Tight 4/2 attain temporarily some minor firming 
May Tight 5/11 seek to moderate growth in aggregates 
June Tight 6/8 seek to moderate growth in aggregates 
6/29 more moderate growth in aggregates 
July Tight 7/16 ^discount rate increased (4 3/4 to 5) 
7/27 more moderate growth in aggregates 
August Tight 8/24 more moderate growth in aggregates 
September Ease 9/21 moderate growth in aggregates 
October Ease 10/19 achieve moderate growth in aggregates 
November Ease 11/11 *discount rate decreased (5 to 4 3/4) 
11/16 somewhat greater growth in aggregates 
December Ease 12/13 ^discount rate decreased (4 3/4 to 4%) 
12/14 greater growth in aggregates 
1972 
January Ease 1/11 greater growth in aggregates 
February Ease 2/15 support moderate growth in aggregates 
March Ease 3/21 support moderate growth in aggregates 
April Ease 4/18 somewhat more moderate growth in aggregates 
May Ease 5/23 somewhat slower growth in aggregates 
June Ease 6/19-20 support moderate growth in aggregates 
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Policy 
1972 Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*) 
July Ease 7/18 support moderate growth in aggregates 
Augus t Ease 8/15 support moderate growth in aggregates 
September Tight 9/19 support more moderate growth in aggregates 
October Tight 10/17 support more moderate growth in aggregates 
November Tight ll/20-21support more moderate growth in aggregates 
December Tight 12/19 slower growth in aggregates than past six months 
1973 
January Tight 1/15 ^discount rate increased (4% to 5) 
1/16 slower growth in monetary aggregates 
February Tight 2/13 somewhat slower growth in aggregates 
March Tight 3/19-20 somewhat slower growth in aggregates 
April Tight 4/2 ^discount rate increased (5 to 5%) 
4/17 moderate growth in aggregates 
May Tight 5/11 ^discount rate increased (5% to 6) 
5/15 somewhat slower growth in aggregates 
June Tight 6/11 ^discount rate increased (6 to 6%) 
6/18-19 somewhat slower growth in aggregates 
b/2y ^discounc rate increased (6 % tc 7) 
July Tight 7/17 slower growth in aggregates 
August Tight 8/13 ^discount rate increased (7 to 7%) 
8/21 slower growth in aggregates 
September Ease 9/18 with moderate growth in aggregates 
October Ease 10/16 with moderate growth in aggregates 
November Ease ll/19-20with moderate growth ia aggregates 
December Ease 12/17-18some easing in bank reserve and money market 
conditions 
1974 
January Ease 1/21-22 with moderate growth in aggregates 
February Ease 2/20 with moderate growth in aggregates 
March Tight 3/18-19 would moderate growth in aggregates 
April Tight 4/15-16 would moderate growth in aggregates 
4/25 ^discount rate increased (7% to 8) 
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1974 
Policy 
Direction Date Policy Consensus and Discount Rate Changes (*") 
May 
June 
July Tight 
August Ease 
September Ease 
October Ease 
November Ease 
December Ease 
Tight 5/21 maintain about the prevailing restrictive condi­
tions 
Tight 6/18 maintain about the prevailing restrictive condi­
tions 
7/16 would moderate growth in aggregates 
8/20 with moderate growth in aggregates 
9/10 with moderate growth in aggregates 
10/l4-15resumption of moderate growth in aggregates 
11/19 with moderate growth in aggregates 
12/9 *discount rate decreased (8 to 7 3/4) 
12/16-17somewhat more rapid growth in aggregates 
1975 
January 
February Ease 
March 
April 
May 
Ease 1/10 ^discount rate decreased (7 3/4 to 1\) 
1/20-21 more rapid growth in aggregates 
2/5 ^discount rate decreased (7% to 6 3/4) 
2/19 more rapid growth in aggregates 
Ease 3/10 *discount rate decreased (6 3/4 to 6%) 
3/18 more rapid growth in aggregates 
Ease 4/14-15 somewhat more rapid growth in aggregates 
Ease 5/16 ^discount rate decreased (6% to 6) 
5/20 maintain prevailing conditions 
June Ease 6/16-17 with moderate growth in aggregates 
July Ease 7/15 maintain about the prevailing conditions 
Aug'.is t Ease 8/14 with moderate growth in aggregates 
September Ease 9/16 with moderate growth in aggregates 
October Ease 10/21 with moderate growth in aggregates 
November Ease 11/18 with moderate growth in aggregates 
December Ease 12/16 maintain prevailing conditions 
57 
APPENDIX B. ANALYSIS OF THE ENTIRE PERIOD, 1956-1975 
A discriminant function was estimated for the entire time span to 
determine whether or not the three subperiods add anything to the analysis. 
The estimated discriminant function was; 
Dj. = d^  + d^ U^ _^  + d^ A^^ IWPI + dg^ Â^ IPI + V^ Pfl (B.l) 
The regression results and the group and overall means for equation 
B.l are presented in Table B.l. 
Only for the unemployment rate and the change in the industrial pro­
duction index are the means during tight months significantly different, at 
the 5% level, from the means during easy months. This result, in addition 
to the absence of a significant coefficient on the price variable would 
indicate that price stability was not an important objective of monetary 
policy for the years 1956-1975. However, the results presented in Table 
4,1 indicate the pric.e stability was the most important objective during 
the Eisenhower administration. Also, Table 4.4 shows that price stability 
did have a significant impact on monetary policy during the Kennedy/Johnson 
administrations. 
Further evidence in support of the three subperiod analysis was found 
by looking at the overall means of the independent variables for the three 
subperiods. An analysis of the means indicated that the average unemploy­
ment rate during the Kennedy/Johnson administrations was significantly dif­
ferent at the 5% level, from the average unemployment rate during both the 
Eisenhowei and Nixon/Ford administrations. Also, the average change in the 
industrial commodities component of the wholesale price index during the 
Table B.l. Results for 20-year period as a whole 
Regression results 
Variable 
Ufl 
t-2 
t-2 
LBP .^,1 
Cons tant 
Tight 
4.6872 
0.3810 
0.4492 
•1257.4919 
Means 
Ease 
5.7227 
0.3395 
0.0351 
-1295.7893 
Overall Coefficient 
Standard Percentage 
error of discriminating 
coefficient power 
5.1791 
0,3612 
0.2525 
1275,6831 
-0.1623/9*** 
0.034541 
0.107698*** 
-0.000005 
0.794581 
0.023446 
0.0386601 
0.032016 
0.000015 
59.90 
7.99 
29.08 
3.03 
F = 15.99317*** R = .21397 
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Nixon/Ford adminstrations was significantly different, at the 1% level, 
from this average during the Eisenhower and the Kennedy/Johnson administra­
tions. Finally, the average change in the industrial production index dur­
ing the Kennedy/Johnson administrations was significantly different at the 
5% level, from the average for thi.s variable during the Nixon/Ford adminis­
trations , 
